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16 May 1984 - Side One 
1'- '""' 't-0.,;,\,l l". -rla ~ .J~~e- l as~,t.. C en-.-, c. 1 . ' I/' /"' '(e'k 
C: TI1is is the morning of 10 December, 1984. I'm at the home of Major General Edward 
' . 
Gear Lansdal e and we are going to be recording another phase in the materials about his 
life. Well the last time I was here General, we'd gotten you into the beginning of WWII 
and you had joined up with the OSS. Sometime or other during the Second WW, did you ever 
get to the EUropean theater? 
L: Never. Never. Ne,,1a,,- d .- J. . 
C: You spent all your time then in - where? 
L: In the U.S. and working on Asia - the Pacific area. 
C: IN the U.S. where were you stationed? 
L: In SAN Fran, Washington, and N.Y. 
C: What kinds of duties did you have in those years? 
L: INtelligence all of it. Originally gathering information, trying to collect maps and .., 
that is get geographic information including maps, ~ - trying to get descriptions of roads 
()..s we,,/ IJ 
and stuff like that ~ trails. And lost materials and target iformation type of stuff. And -==---
that was it mostly. It was the most fascinating thing I've ever run across of gathering 
that sort of information and getting to know places and the peoples and what was going on 
there and what made them tick and the economies, the value of life and the structure of soc-
ieties and so forth. Which is a little deeper tl1an military ,needs really. I just found 
it fascinating and I was locating people in the U.S. - mostly Americans, but not necessarily 
Americans - who had been traveling all around the world, so I met some very fascinating peo-
ple: geologists, explorers, one of them was an ictheologist who, I did a study with him on 
I/ f 
the poisonous and venomous fishes ~ the seas, with warnings and so forth to our troops in 
the Pacific, and he told me that I was the best editor that he'd ever found. I was just 
fascinated. I never thought much about ictheology before. But along with the fishes he had 
been head of fisheries 0r SOOl€thing.. out in the Phillipines before the war, and started tell-
ing me stories about the Phillipines in his travels around. And he'd gone on foot practically 
throughout the islands. He knew the peoples extremely well and the common stories they'd 
tell and their superstitions and what have you. I found later that I was coming across ihis 
trail in alot of places ','s:Jc: t( ;, and one of them was a racket that he'd come across - some 
PHilipinos who were selling SGme urine f r om the mother of God and were putting it in little 
-2-
vials. And she lived up in a cave in the mountains and they were selling it to the super-
stitious people as a cure all and making good money or1 it. And I was traveling in my jeep 
L1A.~ o ,-i on a road on the side of the same mountain that went down southern to blue sGfl and I saw one 
of our aircraft heading low that went into the peak and crashed up there. 
a, {:-t"e.,,...{..,().._,rJ$ 
People-±aeer 
in -l ,h e,je,e-p 
told me I was standing up~yelling at the pilot. Yu know, you damn fool, there's a mountain 
right ahead of you see? And he went fl o ':> ~ -t-he,r-'L- ~ v'~ in and I went up and M 'l l t.eR-Fe- was =r=v-= and all I 
could think of was this ictheologist telling me this story. And in talking to the people 
I started asking about this and they said oh yeah, people remembered this gal who was the 
motheri of God and so on. I thought that's a wonderful place to live among~ people like 
that. 
C: HOw long did you do this kind of work)General? 
L: It's all during the war and afterwards I got into more specialized intelligence, more 
analyzing things that others had gotten all the information on, but doing analytical work 
and getting it prepared for others to read and use. 
C: You spoke of working in San Francisco and New York in the earlier part of the war. Did 
youfstay in the states during all of the war years? 
L: Practically yes. I got out twice on very short trips out in the Pacific. 
C: Where did you go on those trips? 
L: Well I got once as far as New Zealand and one trip into China, but it was very brief. I 
)Io f- :r,_ F-e...l+-. 
didn't do anything. I mean I might just..BGt,- as wel :\ll have gone Except it was sort of fun 
traveling around. 
C: You said when we talked last time that at the end of the war you were in Japa 
was in the Phillipines at the end. 
I 
L: r .~· .vent out to be one of the bodies shoved into Japan on the big offensive and was sent 
0 .... .+ r ,-1 ;,f a.f -//R- e,;, d o{- --+I..~ W a r L...Jkf--
ofr to the Phillipinesnto be ready for the invasion. I forget -Wtrlit"" the invasion was called. 
k~ had two fancy names for it. 
C: Does Olympia sound right, or Olympic? 
L: NO, that's not it. There were two of them. I was one of the two. I think one of them 
was to go up onto HOnchu and the other was Kiushu or something. In other words it was south 
of there and I was to go up into the main island. THey were figuring above 80% casulties. 
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Then you many bodies. 
C: Well, whe+e were talking last time, you were telling me about becoming part of the OSS 
but I was uncertain exactly as to how that happened. 
L: Well, I was recruited in there. I'd given up my commission in the reserves; --We=were 
t-e,5 i-:J ned 
assi gt1Gd before the war >quite a bit. I'd gotten mad about some things so when the war came 
along, I was trying to get it back. I wanted to serve in the war. I had two boys then. 
I lost my job because I was trying to get in the service, my boss took a very dim view of 
I wanted to leave him and go to war. And he fired me so ~ ges o-.fur.tunate'\¥,~ 
~ I'd be a damn fool to do it. So the military intelligence service. had opened up a place in 
San Francisco run by friends of mine who were working there and one of them was also helping 
Iv\ 
OSS get started. So he said I think you want to getAwhile you're waiting for youfcommission 
'!:P 
and everything,icome on down here and see if you can help these people out. Which I did. 
And they were recruiting, which I was doing for them, and trying to put together training 
courses and whatnot and I wrote some of them for them, not knowing a goddamned thing of course. 
And Bill Vanderbilt came out to9.lie was in the Navy had been governor of Rhode Island or 
~ ~ o II e, r', 
something, he came out to San Francisco to open up a branch office for OSS out there /1 And 
I helped him for a time and we became very close friends. ( He's dead now hfi11il I was helping 
him set up shop and also helping the military intelligence service w~'-~ c.&'.>~y. And the 
Army just had great demands for information and we were trying to satisy those as well. So 
I was sort of the handy man for - and they both put me under contract. And the Army came up 
and gave me back my commission - reserve coomission. 
C: At what rank were you then? 
L: I think I came back as a 1st LT. 
' 
CAuse that' s whe.n I~-Oio~ks:igfled, I'd been a 




By the end of the war what was your rank? 
Major. Major. .. -eJ 
.,.,.,~ ~-0 
And this was with the U.S.Army? 
L: Yeah. Army of the United States. It's a reserve on active duty. 
C: In your book you say that you didn't really want to revert to civilian life at the end 
of the war. That you saw possibilities for an American in the military service and that 
-4-
you felt a strong appeal in the U.S. military's part in creating democratic institutions 
in the Pacific. 
L: Yeah. 
v'e'.. 
Which I had done in the Phillipines and were doing in Japan at the time. 
.I\ 
I was 
very impressed when I went up to Japan and I saw the attitude of the Japanese people towards 
MacArthur, who I felt was a prima donna al'Jso forth) along with many others irythe military. 
But he was very effective and I've since c~ to have a very great respect for that guy. 
v.)\... 
He might have been an actor and so forth, I'm sure he was, but he was a very effective ,.. 
person. TI-lank God for that. I think he was lousy as an advisor and commander in the Philli-
pines during the Japanese attack there in '41 '42 but, certainly later he was very great. 
~~-- '-:>~~"-tt~ But they, and compared to the civilian we had out there.in ba~te~s and aid administrator~ 
or economic~ people and so on, the military were strangely farmore liberal in their 
political thinking and their insistence on democratic ways of doing things. ANd the civil-
ians were very straight laced and I think they'd have opted for dictatorship and wherever 
they'd have put another Hilter in Germany and Lord knows what in Japan, and a military rule 
there again. 
whk.,~ 
C: Well it strangely worked that way. !£- was the first institution in this country to 
desegrate itself. To give women equality of opportunity. The army's a strange institution. 
@a:4 ~) 
L: Yeah. It was enlightening to me anyhow. 
C: Someone said abo~t McCarther, that when he became military governor there in Japan, jsCAP 
that the honor that was accorded him by the Japaenese, which was similar to what they'd 
accorded the Ernporer, he didn't feel that was sufficient. 
({~..,..~'-'~~\. L', W e,t (, i+ CD.,_/d h.,,__ve., h e e,,n, 
L: Well, naw, he was quite a person. I've come to have a very high regard for him. Sort 
by grudgingly gotten that way. ANd I'm a little bit tainted...a,ootlt Navy beliefs about him you 
know and what have you, but he was quite a corrmander. And the Phillipinos loved that guy. -r-he..y re..,,1/y o/ Jd. 
C: Yes. Yes. I guess even today they still ••• 
L Oh yeah. yeah. I remember when Truman fired him out there the Phillipine President asked 
me to come down to a cabinet meeting1which I did; and he and the cabinet asked me would the 
American President, meaning Truman, get very angry if the Phillipines suggested, invited 
-+ (A_e,, 
McCarthur to live out the rest of his life in teh Phillipines - they'd made him an honorary 
h .,.,..-I-
citizen ~they wanted to have him l ive there and they were going to send that to him. 
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And I said, no I think the United States would be very pleased if you do something like 
that. I don't think he's going to, but it's a very nice gesture ~go ahead and make it. 
' They said, well will Truman and the United States cut off all aid to us? Something as 
~v-~  as that. And I said, no no, they never would. 
C: Well , Truman would have been very happy had McCat t;:hnr ,fflttl&=fiaue bben :very::tia~d 
; 11 -l---k a. P"' ·· I : f P ; n e 5 
McArthur gone to live/\the rest of his life , i n the Phi.ll:~es. 
L: SUre. Sure. So they went ahead and composed the wire there on yellow paper, ruled 
+L,. e y 
paper like you got there, that message to McArthur and I helped them with it and i sent it. 
I said, tell the guy how m4ch you think o½him. THat's the important thing. 
i \e~ "''""" Jt \A .,._:, ~ --' · ..r. ~..., ,. .J.., 
are hurt right now.' ~,Hrs feelings are hurtt' Yes,11 his feelings are hurt. 
L. ·. , y e, ..c.,,h , 
C: You said by the end of the war you had two sons? ~~at are their names: 
Hls feelings 
L: They first one is Edward - the same as me - I gave him a different middle name. It's 
Edward Russell. And the second one is Peter Carrol\ - Carroll's another family name. Russell's 
a family name and Carrol\' s a family name. 
C: Is that with 2 r's and 2 l's? 
-rt. e, 
L: Yes. T-ffl same as the guy who signed the Declaration who's a forebearer. 
C: Is that right? 
L: Yeah. Yeah. 
C: Charles Carroll of Carrolltown 
L: THAt' s right. 
be.- ·s t,1_., r--e-.-a... .... d. 
C: There were alot of Charles Carrolls around and he wanted King George toAfind the right 
one. ~ 0 
I 
h e., w r of e.. ,. , 
L: He sure wanted to put his address on it. 
c .~ 
You -kimt find me here, oh boy. 
C: That's right. That's a good story. Do you have any daughters or other sons that were 
born l!ater? 
L: NO. Those are the only two. Their mother, my first wife, died after I retired and 
come back from Vietnam the last time. I was living down .-t-el:tt.-e near Mt. Vernon. BUt, I'm 
d,~ \ 
trying to remember when the cls=t;e::wf that was. ' 7 4 I believe she died. And then Pat, whom 
I'd known in the Phillipines before, who had never been to the U.S., retired from her work 
at the Embassy out there and came on to see the United States. She'd been working in the 
-6-
infonnation program and she came to see if the U.S. was as good as she'd been telling every-
body it was in the information program. 
tplere a time. 
And so we got \..A~v-: el, ~ f .(. ~ she'd been _______ ....;__ _ _ 
C: did you leave the service at all for a while after WWII? 
L: NO. I stayed in the Army. I got an Air Force commission. The Air Force ordered me to 
go to to report into the 13thlAir Force. And I told the people up there, the 13th was L.u?:..,D "'- ~ t-
up in the middle of ber,Jis aoo Clark Field, they said, I was ordered to do something here by 
General McArthur, and which I'm now doing and they aren't about to let me go from what I'm 
doing out of this headquaters so, if you want me why don't you just tell Gen. McArthur? And 
they said, you report to duty here , t f ( € -~ \ h { t"" • So it never got resolved and I didn't -
I really didn't go into the Air Force until I cAME back to the U.S. when I went to Intelli-
gence School, the Strategic Intelligence School. 
C: Where was that located? 
L: In Lowry Air Force Base in Denver, Colorado. I thought I was going to go to school there. or +h,,+ They were going to make ma.an intelligence officer, instead1they had me teaching classes 
there. It was sort of strange. -ltt> I never paid any attention !d't' air intelligence before, but 
I taught strategic intelligence and they wanted me to teach economic intelligence,so th~ 
public libraries in Denver were very good and I ciecided tu give non-.:.lassified lectures to ec,Ll_\J C><-l.~ c,{ 
these students and see how much I~ge~ Gftthe libraries, which I did. And I gave very long 
lectures on the Soviet Union and so on and I was amazed on how much I could get on the pub-
lications open to the public. ABout the Soviet Union and about the Iron Curtain countries 
and so, on. Enough to make up real strategic bombing lists and figure out the value of 
certain things through the economy and to the Soviet Union, the people, and its ~ntegral 
whole. And learned to look through the words . of Soviet pe,centages that they ~i:-' very, 
f · \ · 'i~ e... cn;,-;o~e-;;-t\ very, unny - they Just love"'the figures to - · 1 reports and they'll say that a 
Artie station, 50% of the female doctors and 10% of the male doctors got married up at this 
station. "50 You discover that there were two women up there1 and tlra1=- one of them got married and 
so on. BUt it's confusing. It's covering up the real facts. TI-Iey don't ever get down to 
something real simple and tell you what really happened. So you learn to sort of lil r: co 
read them with your tongue in your cheek and sort of read further into them. 
-7-
C: What year was it that you actually received you( commission in the Air Force? 





tl::ly plunk you back a grade? . 
+ti.e.. re,ser✓ e__,/j /i/l)i- a.... 
/ 
L: 
OK. Why did 
I don't know. Probably because there~ a --Gc:rtei::u amount of regular officerw, I imagine. 
The Army promoted me to Lt. Col. out there right at the end while releasing me. So that didn't 
help at all. 
C: So you came back two grades then? I 
L: Well, yeah but I never took it as a real promotion of any sort. 
C: That was also the day and age of permanent and temporary promotion~ 
L: That's right. 
C: So you were a temporary Lt. Col. and maybe your permanent grade at that point was only 
a Capt.? 
(Y\ .,__,'"I be...., J 
L: Yeah A Something like that. Something like that. WEll they were always very reluctant 
about promoting me/ and I never paid any attention to it and during the war they checked on 
some U.S. agency. WHy they'd gone ahead and done something that started a big project against 
Japan, and they said, well,Lansdale came in and told us it was important to do it. ANd they 
5a-;d 
s4ad- he was a 1st Lt. He was in uniform. Well he was talking like he was head of the whole 
U.S. Army, they said. ANd they'd gone ahead and done it. (,l\e,_'lb(P) I just thought this 
is what U.S. and American Agency should be doing on it you see? And they went ahead and did 
it. I spent my whole service that way. Many, many have said, I wish I could have done what you 
did) you knowJ in getting to do the things you wanted to do and were worth doing. ANd I said, 
w r ~ 
they ~ there for anybody if you get enough nerve to do it. And they used to bawl me out. 
jtAs-1-
I used to get terrible bawlings out and I'd ~ say, well, I went into the service for patriotic 
y-e4.s6n :> 
r~€ls0Hs=-and I' 11 quit for the same damn reasons. I just want.C to serve my country as best , 
I can. I'll make up my own mind what that is. 
C: And yet that's a very H~usual attitude for someone in the military - especially at those 
k e\ cL ;-- ,L,/o. K, 
company grade and middle~ grade ~ . 
L: Oh yeah. WEll, r1'J.made up my mind long ago how I wanted to live my life and not doing __ _ 
-8-
but how. That indepence was part of it. When I was in high school once, I sat on the front 
lawn of my house there in Los Angeles at the time, and started thinking, I guess I'd been 
·-fr; flAt.~ 
told to think of college and what I wantedAas a life, something or other - career or something, 
so I started figuring out how people lived and how far they go, and at the time we had all 
sorts of great villians in history and great heroes and everything, and what motivated them 
and how they looked at themselves and so forth, I started thinking that way and thinking do 
C +. /ll'lJ T. W4-'1 ../e,d , . , 
I want to make alpt of money and if so why, and that didn't strike me as what I \mnted to day 
¥,.,"'-\_'\M\ .f~V 
and I startedAwhat makes an American and what is a real goal of the AMerican dream for a 
person to want to achieve and I finally figured out for myself what it was - that independence 
of spirit and being a free spirit was definitely a part of it ~ ANd I lived my own life that 
way. I did when I was in advertising, and I did when I got into the military and I don't 
need to now, I mean it's a part of me now. But many people, youngsters can't find themselves 
weA( 
and leave home and their families and everything to go and find themselves, w1ei-I wish they'd 
sit down like I did in high school that time and really start figureing out what the values 
fook.. 
are in life, what I as a person ~anted to reach and wl:lat- for. ANd I'm happy now that I did 
it. I was suprised that my brothers hadn't did it. Cause I started askting them the/ same 
questions and neither one of them thought about it that much. 
+kl C: Well, you've been around the military long en~gh General, to know hta-t maveric~s, and I 
L', i.~, r ~ ,-....u ~l>... L',1/i.4,f1~d;;rre.d--
think, you were kind of a maverick,,that mavericks are often not received well ~ and there are 
any number of officers - oh, a captain will step out of line once, will disagree with a super-
ior once, and he gets shuttled off into a closet someplace. Or a major general will disagree 
with a Lt. Gen. and it's the end - how over all these years could you be so independent and 
still be trusted so much? 
L: Well, first of all I think most of my actions were unselfish ones. I didn't, '10e of these .. . 
T\ D Y1 e_ 0 (:. -J-t._e, CLe,,/- ,• O " ~ 
~ were self serving in nature. IBe things that they'd would get angry about were actually 
actions done for the greater good of our country. IBe motives were ones that they couldn't 
question. ANd I think that made them madder than anything. rtould. It usually does and 
there were the usual niceties that I never bothered with to follow - going to staff colleges 
and so forth~ They used to tell me in personnel and everything, you haven't made anytkt-tt~ 
and you couldn't anyhow because you're too old or something. Just, after I didn't tell them 
-9-
I'd just come back from the White House and the President asked me if I wanted to go to the 
War Col~ge - he'd send me -~ ""'~~I f . He said, I think you' re too old now but I' 11 request 
it personally and they'll accept it, which they would have. Eisenhower did that once to the 
National War College. ANd everybody was telling me ehhh, you've never been to the War College. 
J :J"+ s .... ,, 
Well I ~ well I could have gone you know. I just kept that to myself. It didn't 
mean that much to me. I'd gone up and taught there. I'd given lectures there at all of our 
./ 
War Colleges and used to when I was in the service, butYnever regretted that I didn't go, but 
I didn't feel I didn't need it - it would have been nice to have gone, but people that get in 
trouble and get rebuffed and so forth and shoved into closets are people who can be wounded 
that way. And I don' t think I was ever in a position to be wounded. I was, everybody thought 
I was wounded and cut into pieces and everything, and I'd still be going and I just readjusted 
my goals and going, well they stopped me from doing that - this still needS'~ing and I'm the 
only one who can do that, so I'm going to stay ·and do that. ANd they did that the last time 
in Vietnam, they really stopped me cold and what I was trying to do there and c.1~ 1~ the U.S. 
didn't know how to fight the war and the people in power and the bueracracies and everything1 +he_ b oL•~...,r.a..e-' ...,,s 
Wt>V\. $(.(,\ ) they stopped me cold. But they didn't win a goddamned thing for our country and 
that's the only thing I regret, not for myself at all. 
C: How should we have fought that war? 
L: Well, first of all we should of helped the Vietnamese to be strong enough to have fought 
it and to have gotten into the politics and psychology of a conrnunist.sf-1:%f people's war. 
Which would have been hard to do but we could have taught them. WE could have made the enemy 
leadership a target for attack as they made our leaders a target for their psychological and 
political attack. We could have made a lot of things subject to psychological attack which 
if it had been native Vietnamese fighting they could have done. It was hard to teach the 
--1--"-e,se.., 
Vietnamese that ~ were important things to do, but that could have been done. I used to 
do that every time I was with them. The United States thought it was non• sense, that is our 
key officials out there, never understood that. I don't think any of them understood that a 
leadership was a committee up there, a corrmittee that was just begging to be defeated by 
Lyndon Johnson who had been the city board supervisor or something in one of the Texas cities, 
l..(.) e....,C:., ~ 
he could have licked them. But he never understood that there ...Yl.el'.e ~ enemy leadership, I 
-10-
don't think he ever got the names of any of the enemy ~leaders up in Hanoi. He certainly 
let them get away with murder on the thing. But they were telling the people, look these 
guys are bringing you this and why don't you get rid of them and everything Ctle~,bl~ ~ ich 
we used to do with the Kaiser and with Hitler and so. We got the German people to go through 
with a couple of revolutions in fact. 
-1-Ae.,,ir-
Kicking out~ leaders. We used to get mad at that. 
a.., 
WE got mad at the British originally, at George III. And tfte. guy got elected mayor in Chicago 
in the 20th centruy for being against George III. TI-le Americans hated King George that much. 
But we made sort of a hero out of Ho Chi MinhJ which was silly. We never fought politically. 
And I was trying to get the Vietnamese to take the role of leading the fight to save themselves. 
And there were some good Vietnamese leaders and I wanted ~ to learn to do it and let them 
--<"'C'.\V\D 
take the ~@igns and lead themselves out of trouble and run the government - make mistakes and 
;+ 
learn from tt'tem when they'd make one. As it was with the Americans we were doing things our-
selves that the Vietnamese should be doing - taking away the initiative from them. We talked 
down our noses to them so that if the/1made a mistake they'd hesitate to ever let us know it 
and admit it. TI-Iey were afraid we were going to bawl them out or laugh ,at them or something, 
or maybe cut off aid and everything. We wouldn't trust you guys with help this way. The 
last time I went out, I figured that the Vietnamese leadership needed friends and they were 
..,_ > + lv2..,,1 
bae-..., all afraid of me, the generals ~knew they killed a friend of mine - Ngo Dinh Diem, when 
they'd come in. And I said no, you're stuck where you are now and I want to help you succeed. 
Cause it's your country and they all started coming over to my house and dropping in and ou-v 
Ambassadors and other officials were suprised that they used to come over to my house to talk 
to me and hwere Vietnamese leaders and their wives and families would drop in just as a friend. 
And they didn't take me as being an official. And they also let me know mistakes they'd made 
and so forth. I used to sit there quietly face to face with them and go over some of their 
programs and where they'd gone wrong and would never bawl them out. I was always well, how 
~ ,,--,-
do you correct that? How do you get it so it works right? And ~ all these people depend-
on ,\-1,1.:-s 
ing on this and everything and they're going to need some helpi and why don't you do it this 
~\-
way and get so and so. And they knew 1.ait so, and that's what we should have done with that 
+-sort of help_wibh Vietnam. 
C: You say that we did things that they should have been doing for themselves, could you give 
me examples of this? 
-11-
5tL 
L; Oh, alot of the example the aid mission there would get provincia& t to get help 
into people. 1Hey'd start running out of rice or something. We were trying to teach the f•D ,J#fl C,, l ,A.,,/ 
provincial Vietnamese lpfficials to take care of their own aid programs and so on. So we'd 
get the government to distribute rice up to people for the needy and the American advisors 
up there would see the rice coming in and they, the province chief, the Vietnamese would be 
worrying abous wel~ how does Saigon want me to do this? Well , they'll fire me if I do it wrong. 
And there was alot of that. They were wondering what to do and the Americans would say, these 
people are hungry and they'd grab the rice and you ~ distribute it this way, throw it on the 
I t'\ ' 
• ~ . ..J-,; a..,+.i v' -e.., truck , go out and distribute it. ANd take all the - I\ away from them instead of 
telling the province cheif;, well, you do this if you want, I' 11 call up my friend up ln Saj.gon 
. I l .I ~~ c ""' ~ a c..~ . and he' 11 back you and so on so the government won' t D ~ . 'IO'-' ~ ,- • . 1Hey' d never 
do it that way, they'd take it over. So then the province chief would miss the opportunity 
to maybe have done it a little wrong and everything but there was a great deal of that all 
;-I- ""tt.-:S ' over the country. The same in the military /I Some of the Vietnamese resented it and still do> 
and some of the Vietnamese are going to be writing books and everything. There is a feeling 
of bitterness towardSthe Americans who were there. ANd I think in about 10 years there'll be 
books out about the things that the Americans did wrong in Vietnam. By people on our side 
qfl l 1" who we were helping. And they're hesitating to write;1because it will look iike ingratitude 
and everything, but there are very deep feelings on this. I know the foreign Minister and then 
he became President of their Assembly over there - a politician,and a very distinguished 
public servant wants to come and work here in Washington with the Wilson Center as a fellow, 
to write a piece essentially on1 could Vietnam have won the war under President Diem? Meaning 
if you Americans hadn't [tape ends]. 
Tape# 2 Side 2 
16 May 1984 
(10 v~ L'f.!_'-1 ~ ~~ ~+ c1~k 
C: Yeah you were saying that that will take care of part of the political 
aspects that no American has written on yet. 
L: Yes. That's true. ANd this is by a Vietnamese politican. I hope he understands he can 
express himself cllearly enough on the politics and the psychology of things. He's asked 
me to act as one of the sponsors. I want to see something like that attempted. So I'm going 
to push real hard for his getting this fellowship. But there's another Vietnamese in Texas 
o•L-t-a university, that'swritten me, and he writing a book about the American Ambassadors~in Viet-
nam. And I'm sure, he wants to know which Ambassadors were friends to Vietnam and were acting 
really like diplomats should. And which ones were coming out there as Vice Consulates as 
-le I I,·,. ') 
proconsulates of the Unites States, mighty United States, and t ehH.--±ng them you either do it 
our way or else we'll stop all aid and all help and so 
C: I think the answer is yes. That's what they were. 
L; That's what some of them saw themselves as. 
C: Oh yes sir. 
L; But he was writing me and I said well, you talk to Vietnamese. I said, don't try to 
figure out what policy they were following from the Department of State. Do it from a 
Vietnamese viewpoint of how these people looked to you and what all your contacts with them 
t:J_ C: C.o'L n f--
and everything. I said that'll be a true ~ t you can write. It'll be one nobody else can 
following from Washington - I don't do and if you try to figure out what policies they were ~ver~l½ 
~ think you canA that out clearly enough, which is what he'd wanted to do. And so 
l(C:i<J. ?ef' -, 
but, these are thoughts of refugees l of some of the old leaders that have come here. ANd I'm 
~ b~~aJo.~ 
sure that they're going to be thinking that way. Ther e were t wo of th~ . ~ rds to the 
U.S •. One of them is writing a book, one of them isn't - but he's very bitter the same waY. 
And they come over and talk to me and I say, put it in a book or tell somebody this. WHy me? 
You know my feelings. WEll you're a friend, we can talk to you. It's the same thing . Because 
I've been a friend out in Vietnam and made it very easy to talk to me, which the American 
officials knew, l_cJ,ie_ said, he put it down, he said, you've got patience to spend time with 
these people. I ~~id1 no, it's not patience I'm trying to listen to what they're really saying hcl «..aP, a.l\ l\-- \ s 
l\nd I teW ___ t.Ris. And I'm no in thei hearing what I think. I 
want~ to hear what they think first. And then I' 11 respond to it. 
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C: Well don't you think that ~ someone like Gen. Maxwell Taylor or Lodge flies from 
tlb- /4 
Washington to Saigon, spends one day on a carefully sponsored tour --£9 terr city and tj,.e ou~tj 
~Jl ~~ s t\ 
lying 1aio~;nd then before flying back to the STates they tell the Vietnamese..( don't you , 
think ...the:1 speaking from ~ simply a well of experience and knowledge? 
6f COCA~~ .f-h e 
L: [Laughs]. No that's what we do all the time and of course ~ Vietnamese, more of them 
are aware of that. 
C: How can any responsible person do that? How can they be so egotistic? 
L: Yeah. That's - HOw can we? I don't know. WE seem to be very good at turning out 
people. 1Hey're doing that in Washington all the time. So. WE used to send people over 
there and I used to say, you know Washington is a big city and we're used to alot of these 
antics among Americans and we can understand them and maybe forgive them or at least not pay 
attention to some of the more annoying habits. But goddamn it - why do we have to export it 
to foreign countries? ANd have them as officials there? And we had a number of officials 
like that who served in Vietnam. 
C: Those same officials jumped down Jane Fonda's throat because she travelled to Hanoi, 
went on a carefully sponsored tour, after 12 hoursj in the city sl1e makes this pronouncement 
that the North Vietnamese are simply humanitarian and they wouldn't torture anyone. And 
we sayJhow stupid can she be? But we sent our own officials to Saigon .and in the same 
length of time they became experts. 
L: Yeah. There are other factors in there. First of all we have prisoners who were hurt 
because of what Fonda said. 
C: 
., 
Oh absolutely. . ( 
<..jtveab ,e 
L: And to me what she did was unforgettable. THE other guys were stupid jerks who came 
out that 
C: Maxwell Taylor - a stupid jerk? 
L; Well, not a stupid jerk [laughs] 
C: Come on1 General. 
L- ; C. fo~e__ +<:J ,T'" , 
L: A patrician , cold, thinking, short sighted person. He doesn't understand human 
beings I'm afraid. And the same with Lodge - very patrician again. Again, I don't think 
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he ever understood that he was dealing with real live human beings out there. And I don't 
think Taylor ever did. I don't think Westmoreland ever did. NO. TI,at is too bad. 
C: Well, Westmoreland, someone was telling me, maybe it was you General, that he arrived 
in-country knowing no Vietnamese, and not liking the Vietnamese. 
L; No, I didn't tell you that. 
C: And he left knowing no Vietnamese and liking none of the Vietnamese. And from what 
I know about the man that pretty well sums up. 
L: Yeah. That might be true. He used to go out and see the Chief of STaff every Monday early 
-1-h e.r1 
and tm.1 they'd go down to essentially a U.S. country team meeting - they called it something 
else out there, I forget what. I was a member of it but I forget what it was. And when 
WEsty was leaving his place was taken by Abrams [name supplied by Currey], Abrams asked me to 1 ~ ,._ ;I see him and have lunch with him alone, said you got any thoughts on what I should do? And 
~i. ~e, II I told him, well, at least change the way you visit the Chief of Staff of the Vietnaml!.Army. 
i\. 
I said, Westy goes out and sees him, he goes out in convoy really, in his sedan. He's got 
an aideand bodyguards with him, he's got extra bodyguards wi--tlr him in a 6x8 truck after him 
with machine guns and so forth mounted and a couple of jeep loads of heavily armed troops with 
him and with police fore and aft on motorcycles. This is a big convoy and they go out early, 
at 6:00 in the morning or something like that7out to the Vietnamese headquarters and Gen. 
Vien is out there and he's got his troops lined up and they present arms and up comes this 
cu1d t\ big convoy ~ out steps thePt8nsul of the United States. And he said, how are you this 
'(l 1'- \ \ 5a.y-,-f-/.e0 BJ1t'-rat-/ , 
morning1 General? HOw are things going? Fine, he 3aid. Of course they are. 1)1is guy's got 
\' ,.. A,v.,ieH'l/."lw<i 
an army and he's got an army too. Everything's well with my army.So the~ proconsul tells 
u 
him how goddamed well everything's going with the U.S. Army and says, how's it going with 
\,\. \ \,\. 
yours? Fine says the Vietnamese General. TI-IE American general goes down to the meeting and 
o~&J· 
tells the1 Americans everything's going well with the Vietnamese. Half their troops have 
deserted or something but they aren't about to tell him. 
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Well, I said, now General Abrams, do you drive? Of course, the guy's 
a tanker, and he says Of course I do. Whyn't you go over in a jeep 
o:..,n ,:)t... ;de.--
and take an aide if you want but, you don't need me, really. You go 
Leo \J l!.-v\ V1evi 
over in a jeep. Vien'll be there with all his troops lined up and 
you say Can I park my jeep around here someplace? 
Go out, and first thing say I'm worrying about 
Be a human being • 
• (pick some worry 
with your troops they aren't doing right) and Vien'll say "You haven't 
heard anything yet. Let me tell you what's happening with mine." 
And you get down to the truth very quickly. And maybe you can help 
each other a little bit. And maybe you can buck each other up on some 
of these things. And I said, better yet, instead 
he's got to come from way out of town t (l{et over 
of going over there, 
hJ~ 
to~headquarters in 
the morning. Whyn't you invite him over to breakfast? You live not 
too far from his headquarters and he can come and have breakfast with 
you and go to work. And the two of you sit alone. Don't have servants 
overhearing and everything. If he wantsto bring aides, they can eat 
out in the next room with yours. I said, it's about time we got the 
v-f + /,,.(1., re,, • 
thing on the basis of human beings talking to each other~ And he thought 
that was a good idea. He said he'd do it. I don't know whether he did 
or not. But he was the type of guy that would. Now, I suggested things 
like that to Westmoreland who wouldn't want to listen to me on it. I 
used to go in and he'd just tell me to shut up. I'd bring up a 
psychological warfare ideas to him and troop behavior and so forth 
l)..S'e J. -/-r, 
(and he~ tick them off in little notes: troops misbehaving. I'd get 
reports from Vietnamese and get them over to him personally to get 
someone to look into it and he would never really talk to me. Very 
hard to talk to him. 
C: Well, I'm sure he would talk to you, but it was very hard for him --
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to listeri to you. 
L: Oh, maybe that was it. Maybe that was it. I'd go over and have 
breakfast with him once in awhile, or lunch, or something, just the 
he'd 
t wo of us alone or /have a visitor, and his visitors would come over 
and have lunch with me afterwards. They would tell me and ••• I 
remember when the first VC rbckets came in after the Tet Offensive 
and they started rocketing Saigon. goddamed big things coming 
in. One of them was a guest of Westy's and he said Jesus! Westy's 
I 
never heard those rockets. They hit the house next door, and they 
said, I'll show him where the thing was fired from. I've been trying 
to get the military to get over there and clean out 
the spot where these guys are carrying these things in and setting 
them off oyer across the river. I'll show you exac t ly where. ~ · 
Y::, used to do that when there were attacks on Tan Son Nhu_t and everything. 
Which I stopped because they immediately started shelling everything in 
,::,..nd,. e,l'Y'~/ :1,h,,.d-. 
sight and all my friends were getting killed ~ their homes Couldn't 
get the American troops out to hand-to-hand stuff; you know ~ confronta-
tion. 
e. -./Q,,ry ..//4,-,,,J 
They didn't get in close enough so's you don't blow up ce¥PJ"J i Ilg 
for ten miles off. 
C: What is your feeling , General Lansdale , about the troop buildup 
~vef--t;here+- of America in Vietnam? Did we need those troops there? 
L: Well, it was .•• there were empires of , you know, headquarters , 
and of / ·. i4 \ '> , --i-Jiier;e,. The combat troops had a tremendous backstopping 
of headquarters and supply units and so forth that stagger ed the 
imagination. The -- I don't think we needed all that. 
/ 
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C: Do you know General DeWitt Smith, General? 
L: No. 
C: He was commandant of the War College for two different tours. 
+-v l'\Ae,.. 
And he said-1 someth:i..ng to the effect that, this is a paraphrase, 
. .s 
h · 1 • l . 1 . h .d f t t k PX tat It ·w:a:s s1.mp y 1.mmora 1.n t e m1. st o a war zone o soc s 
with French perfumes and nylons. And he was concerned about all this 
backstopping of combat troops withcombat service support (interrupt) 
L: f-/a., ; r -s I' r .._ y . 
L: Friend of tnine wrote a song the hairspray in the PXs. It's a 
comment on MacNamara and his • · about getting hairspray into the 
-H"~"" 
PXs. They're gonna drop it on the VC from the air and kill)'f all cr;i 
~ Laugh~. 
C: Well, I worked out the ratio once. I don't know whether this is 
. we., h&.-J 
correct, but as nearly as I could figure, ii wffB something like 52 
or 53,000 combat troops actually performing combat duties when we 
country. 
had 550,000 troops in :.ldmxRX That's 1/l0th , 1/l0th of our soldiers. 
L: Yeah. 
C: effectively fighting. 
we.-
L: Yeah. I wonder if -awe- had that many. 
C: How about American policies like, oh, supporting Diem early on 
-'rke-t be.c.-~- e.. 
in his agrovilles and New Life villages and then ea.me-strategic hamlets 
where we rounded up Vietnamese and moved them into protected areas. 
What was your attitude toward that? 
L: I think that was. wrong. That was a British idea ess.ent ially, and 
by/ Br i t isher that never understood how they won down in Malaya. He 
was in charge . He was running things. 
C: Sir Robert Thompson. 
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+tte.-,-u 
L: Yeah. But I've been in meetings with the British /land I started 
telling them how they won in Malaya, and they never understood the 
Malayans. They were a wonderful people. And as soon as they gave 
11alaya independence they started winning the war. Of course, they were 
against Chinese guerrillas who looked different, you could spot them. 
i,... $+-~,.ti y. 
The Malayans could spOt them A Which the British didn't always do. 
But they never understood that their victory there owed a great deal 
' +~f' 
to the political act of independence~~which I've gotten in talking to 
some of the -Malayan politicos. And the Brits used to come over to the 
-/--y r>e- c { e n em v 
Ph±llippines, cause we were fighting the same k:i:ml-- of men at the same 
ti-me. And they'd be amazed at the little things that we did that were 
blown up out of all proportion (they said). So, well, that's 
psychol0gt'cal action. That's all. As long as everybody believes it, 
fine. Tt's to our favor. We're trying to make it come true . They 
$".ti,;,te ,:>(:, 1-ti~Nj +-hDl;LJ I,_/-
thoughtll that was terrible. I said, well, the other side's doing that 
all the ~~e goddam ti-me, see, and if we can get away from it then 
apparently we are, Thad no idea it would spread so far. You're hearing 
stories- over on the mainland of Asia that they're this way, well, why 
T1m all for :j:t. But apparently the connnunists . thought that themselyes. 
Didn't believe that. Which is, we should ha1Ve fought that way in 
Vietnam, see, I'd learned all that in earlier fighting in the Philip-
pines. 
C: Tf you could have succeeded in having Ngo Dinh Diem adopt your 
suggestions •.. 
L: He did originally, when he was firs.t president. He got someone like 
Lou Conein, who was there at the time or Rufe Philipps, who was there. 
When Ngo Dinh Diem was first president t hey said it was very different. 
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The • • . Vietnam was, being run decently and so forth. Nhu and the 
political party people who were with him had secret police arresting 
people. r got it stopped. I went down and asked Diem about it and he 
didn't know- about it. His brother was doing it. He didn't tell -hffl: ~ e,, +ha-f--
..t-t,,,,_;f-. 
a'bette-:H:.-=±b-a-t 1 knew ~ut it. And I just said well the families 
are coming to me. What am I going to tell them? That you guys are 
worse than Adolf Hitler or something,you know? No, no, no. And he 
stopped it right fast. And we were •.• I had some of the people 
that had helped M:agsaysay, including his closest assistant in defense 
who was over as an attache--a Philippine attache in Vietnam--and I 
put him in helping Diem all the time. The guy had tremendous ideas 
and ability and energy and feeling for the people. And who was helping 
'Ille and who stayed on there afterwards. But after I left, the Americans 
and so forth. who were there were pushing them the wrong way into doing 
the wrong things. He didn't understand a lot of things, 
would 
I used to 
+1,,t2wt 
beg fftm- to. We would have talks and he \:ise~ ask me "what does 
these 
fleoring a loan mean."? I had a meeting with tt:f8' bankers and they 
were talking about flooring a loan and everything, and I said goddam it 
I'll 
our AID mission people should tell you that./ Get them over. He asked 
me chain of comm.and. He said, you military talk about chain of connnand. 
:;-t:t.: J_ 
I~. I'll tell you and everything. I'll get our general running 
11AA,G to tell you. They should tell you these t hings, not just throw 
these phrases around. I told him, I said, essentially this is what it 
111eans and then told him, but if we'd ever really explained ourselves as 
we went along and let this guy learn to start running t hings. I would 
sit there and he would say, "Come on out on trip~around t he country 
wi:th me," and r s·aid "No, you don't want to have any damn Americans 4J ; f. 4 '-/ o ~. 
You 1r e a Vietnamese. You're a Vietnamese leader. 
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C: And yet you went on trips around the country with Ramon Magsaysay. 
L: Yeah. That was different. They were used to Americans in the 
Philippines,. But not politically. Not when he was running for pres-
ident. 
e,S • 
But when he was Secretary of Defense ~ But in Vietnam, the 
about 
V±etnamese were highly sensi t ive ~e independence and having no 
foreigners. 
e,re., . 
It's a very anti-foreigner civilization~~ I told Diem, 
you have photographers with you. Please show me pictures of you doing 
whatever you're doing there and I'll look at them, I said, with you. 
And I'd look at them. He'd be talking to a little peasant and I said 
look at this guy. Re's got his hat off. He's h0lding it. His head's 
down. He's not looking you in the eye. Row do you know he's telling 
you the truth? I said, That 1 s , your fault. the way you're talking to 
him. And the way you approach him and everything. T want to see 
people with their hats on looking you in the eye and talking to you,. 
A~· a friendly, leader, that they want to explain -=- what they've got 
or what their problems are. And I'd get him pictures of Sihanouk and 
other leaders around Asia and show them to him. I said, Now this is 
Sihanouk out crossing a swampy ground. The camera doesn't show all the 
people lying on the ground so he doesn't get his feet wet, see, and 
walk on their rumps. 
\.J&L-S 
C: J).;f;:,d• he really? 
L: Oh, yeah. I said 
C: That's funny. 
L: I's-aid you can tell that from the faces of thos-e looki ng at this 
the 
guy,. He gradually started changing. Then I sicced Ii Filipinos on hi-m. 
They're. like young American college people. They taught the Vietnamese, 
To (!a.rry 
for example, ~~Diem--put him up on their shoulders--when 
their feelings were up and they felt like cheering and everything. 
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And the last of the old Viet Minh went out of Central Vietnam by ship 
when they exchanged from north to south and south to north and went 
out and Diem visited there. I said, you do that now. And the 
Filipinos taught the Vietnamese how to do it and they got Diem up 
on their shoulders (and I had a picture of him and he was scared 
they were going to drop him or something and he was hanging on their 
hair with h±s- fists) and all the people .cheering and you can tell 
from their faces that it was a great moment they were sharing. He 
should have been yelling with them but he was looking scared, see, 
b e ca. u.6e---
hu:t;- I'd teas,e him about it, see, I'd say Jesus, you should have been 
grinning along with. them, yelling, and it was a great moment for all of 
a- i,1 ,' .s 1 t-y; e f-,.Uet..;vi_ 0 ;, '-f o _,t.{. I 
~ showed that picture later. I went back to ·wand they were 
\ +-'1 0 .'e-W\ 
having trouble ~ they were telling me 
. is 
that he~ a Mandarin, very 
remote, this that and the other thing, and r said, here, take a look, 
-r,._Ke.. 
this :j:s the guy when I: was advising him when he was president. ~ a 
look at Diem and the people. 
•e-it,Lr"e.. 
They said, I don't believe this ' This 
couldn't be the same man. This couldn't ever have been taken here. 
It was all different, the approach. And he was responding to all this, 
the feeling of the people. We would find out conditions in the 
countrY' and I: found out where the mosquitos were 
or where simple things could be done to effect a 
particularly bad 
~+-
• w:~ he · as 
head11')an :j:n the government could take an ac t ion that would help people 
and r'd tip him off that this is so, ask them around there, so this is 
what you can do. Then have this ready to follow- up immediately. 
He used to take those actions. Mosquito net s and sometimes blankets 
when people wer e cold, sometimes food , all d:j:fferent very simple things 
that he could act as president on. 
C; Do you have, -maybe, a 25 point or 10 point or a 2 point policy - that 
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would have worked in Vietnam? 
L: I don't have any written out, no. 
· C: I don't mean that, I mean just in your mind. What could we have 
really done to have insured that Diem or someone like Diem was able 
to 
L: Yeah . it would have been Diem or someone like him. You 1re 
right. Beeµ Diem maybe for a time and then someo e else. We could 
have figured out some way for orderly change. I think that the 
thrown 
connnunists were/very much off their time-table and their thinking 
by and he was president v,IAen 
and everything ±:i:~e Diem was-:i::a his actions when/he refused to go 
on uniting 
ahead with the voting '1:ha'l:-w6t:t±a-"-ttave-tt:a:i:'l:ea-north and south after-
wards. Which was the correct thing, I think. It was a '!:ha'!: thing 
that they had rigged up under great pretensions and I think he was 
~ -
much stronger than they ever thought. He had much more of a following 
than they had ever thought was possible. He was much more a Vietnamese 
nationalist than any of the ¥:i:e'l:ftamese-connnunists ever were. 
And people would catch on. 
finally 
-f o c.lu:t-"J e.,, .-i J d-
And they had -a t.a;i.M.- tha t ~took them a 
long time to/figure out h o w ----- to start bringing them down. 
Which they did. I had always thought that possibly we couldn't have 
won but we could have made enough political points there so that any 
eventual taking over of the South would have to be far more polihcal 
than the communists eyer thought. Far more political than military. 
And they would have to give up points politically to do it. And they 
would ... there would have been a lot of compromises and it would 
have wound up possibly like uh, uh, like in Europe ••. the connnunists 
there. 
C: East and West Germany? 
L: No. Opposite Italy. Yugoslavia. It would have oecome much more 
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like a Yugoslavian type of solution, and uh, I thought they were 
starting entirely too late and they had cards stacked against them. 
there ~
There was .•. and what the Americans sa~a didn't omlesLctnd- was 
that t he French- colonial system in Indochina was that the French 
e,ve.,r i C, ,,,J .J-,..1, ,.,_ ,te, ,I, -4- 1. : 4 ~ 
ran E-W!Urn~tLt t he ~ . And when they pulled out, they left behind J· ,,._,.,. +-a.. 
court 
~ untrained bunch of people. The peP-e system that the Vietnamese 
I 
had wasnt a really effect:i,ve administrative arm of government. It 
sort of kept track of things but didn't run things and Diem had 
served in that in the old imperial days and he'd been province chief 
and so forth. Bu't they hadn't been they'd been sort of°I,rovince 
\?..d--" 
supervisor or advisor almost and he knew the country very well;t he 
I 
didn't know how to run anything; he didnt know how to administer. 
He really didn't. Nor did any of the other Vietnamese. And, we had- -- +he1 had 
a gover nment with departments in it, ministries, and Jesus, 
the ministries had been run by t fe French and all of a sudden the 
door man was brought in: "You are the Minister, or you are this, t hat 
thing 
and the other. ,i And all he knew was 
you 
ee sit at a desk and what do you 
do next? He didnt really have a clue. They were smart ' enough to keep 
their-mouths- shut , you know, and try to get along all right and find 
out. Some of the · ietnamese intellectuals who had college educations 
or 
had done it in Europe a-Ha in Hanoi (which was the only college) ... 
They were try-ing, themselves, to set up something . But they 'd gone 
,f!/rV 
into professions, most of themAdoctors or dentists, There were a 
few lawyers-, But there were none of them in the government , and they 
needed a whole 1JliH;,s of people trained. Well, the communists had 
started in '45 with the same thing, but they didn't have the French 
or anybody else there and they - --- - started to run their own 
affairs. And they killed off a lo t of their people, a lot of t heir 
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officials were killed liquidated by tlleir own party people. 
For making mis·takes. So, they gradually got people in that could run 
things, administer and everything. · But they learned all the time 
they were fighting the French. Then when we took over from the French, 
the Vietnamese on our side hadn't been that way, even the Army, had 
been part of the French forces, had French officers running it. And 
uh, the Vietnamese units were almost untrained as a real military 
force. I held a ••• I was trying to get pacification started and 
I quickly found out what it was was the Viet Minh in those days would 
withdraw under the Geneva agreement ·up to the North. Well, they 
pulled out of areas in the South and what are conditions in all these 
. officials ~ or 
provinces? So I called all the province/ together into Saigon a:,. a 
meeting and they were practically all Frenchmen. And uh, province 
and district chiefs. And we were supposed to send vietnamese in to 
+-"4 + I 
· do tt and we didnt have any Vietnamese to do it. We had a few 
goverD11Jent people working in Saigon and Hanoi (who had come down from 
Hanoi), but they had worked in offices and sat at the door when 
visitors came in and so on. Usually had them stamp things, the '.French 
sy~tem of doing any, business of the government, to stamp . something 
with a rubber stamp and it'd always cost you, mail a letter, they 
have to stamp a piece of paper with a rubber stamp. But they badly 
needed a government service body of people, trained and everything. 
So we started training on that. But we were starting the training 
6- ou Id 
as· though it~ take ten years or twenty years. We got Michigan 
State and AI'D working on it. I was explaining. They had a plebiscite 
f.- roM 
set~ Geneva to decide who runs this country and we need people 
representing Saigon throughout the country and we need it tomorrow · 
~c.--
and it should have been there yesterday. Where do we ge t l-t; from? 
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And I got to find that out. So I .decided our pacification would be , 
where there wasn't anybody from Saigon out there, we can send out an 
U, I\ : -/- C (. ,,_ <>11, e., '5 o r -,-
army 1;etffl1 temporarily and let them try to run something and represent 
Saigon. At least they had radio communication with Saigon and they 
have some discipline and some sense of order. They ha:ve a headquarters 
in Saigon and so forth. So, the pacification campaign was.,was, was 
gett ing ;1rmy out. We had . as soon as we'd get some people into 
(supply?) 
pos·iti:on to :fopplant them and there werent · any roads around or anything 
that civilian rule could take place and the sooner the better on it. 
So ... and there were several areas the Viet 11inhw/ e leaving they 
had under -military ~tt±e control in the South, but i,t worked out at 
eeneva, and we'd have to send the army in to bring la,~ and order into 
those areas., supplanting the Viet Minh pulling out. But there wasnt 
-\-1,.e,r'V 
a ci:vi:1 service of any sort/\that meant anything. · And T had some of the 
Viet }1inh had quit in great disgust (having) discovered that the Viet 
11inh were comrqunist to their great horror and they were patriotic 
h,,._.J. C., 0 ""- e.., {'f- ,· ,t 'i I.A,_ f ' 
VNese, and they ~ in and tried to help Diem.Se, And I started them 
tr,li'ning people t o go out and get people to learn how· to fend for 
themselves: out in the provinces and distric ts, And I was running a big 
f-- /,. ,e,:t' . 
-multiple operation I .~~ his was all well on the way when I left. I don1t 
know· what happened . t o all these things afterwards. 
me that Di·em had stopped elections in the towns·. 
Uh , they were telling 
I 
Well, that wasnt so. 
When I· was. there, that was the one thing we were trying .• ·we had 
teams out teaching people how to run their own affairs in each. town 
and each. district and each province. I' had veterans, a veterans.I organizat ion 
started, a,nd I· was begging them to get in and speak up to the government 
off i:cials on what was needed in place and everything to giy e the people 
v o ,'c_e__. 
a ch:ois~.. That apparently went by the boards. I dotit know what happened. 
I left it all on paper for people to follow through on and I left 
organizations intact and had the VNese working on it. I dodt know 
whatever happened. 
C: You left in '62? 
L: No. I first left ••• it was in the 50s, · the end of '58. 
C: At that Ume do you think the Viet Minh or Viet Cong by now, 
actually, were they communist in order to achieve nati onalist pur-,-
poses or were 
L: ~. /VO 
C; I don't know if I said that right. Were they usi.ng nationalism 
to achieve cofflII}unist purposes . • • "' 
L: That is correct. 
p)o ... :+,'on..._l; .. + p 1.A. r f'oses 
C: Or were they using communism to achieve n~nalism,1 
L; They were using nationalism to achieve comll}unist pu1?pos·es. ·. And 
7 
many· nationalists joined in with them who were nationalists in feeling 
and then Cq:Il}e • • . saw· suddenly the communist di:sc:j:plines and so 
forth get going and so a good nationalist who had done something for 
the country· getting knocked out because they had done something that 
6,a, IL $ ,e. • 
hurt the comjun±st• I\ And uh, didnt like it and uh, were looking for 
And .,..; I. e-n. ~ 
something else.II Diem came along; ~ was truly a nationalist and 
he got thes-e people on his side. And he was· a 1nuch truer nationalis·t 
than Ho Chi:'Minh ever was. And that's why I was trying to tell 
Washington at the time, and I told all our dumb leaders here: I said , 
if you had an election today, you're telling me Ho Chi •Minh is so 
well li·ked, the ·French are telling us that, and that is not true. 
I · said , he heat the ·French but the French were hated out there fo 't' 
being ·French. And they're foreigners· and I said Diem would win in a 
popularity contest hands down if it could be an hones·t vote. · T don't 
\ 
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think anybody here believed me but I said tha s true. But I used to 
wander around _ in civilian clothes out there and I'd get upcountry and 
kids 1 d throw rocks at me for being a dirty (illegible). 
FA/ '.RU RU RU RU throwin rocks and thinking I was a lone Frenchman 
out SQ1lleplace. I'd usually dr i ve a French. (END OF SIDE OF TAPE). 
